LA FILANTROPIA INFLUENZA LE SCELTE DEGLI INDIVIDUI? CONSIDERAZIONI ALLA LUCE DI UN ESPERIMENTO DI ULTIMATUM GAME
Abstract
Economic theories have reconsidered the factors that guide the choices of individuals, not only focusing on those strictly economic. In recent years, the wide use of behavioural games has provided interesting evidence that contradicts the neoclassical axioms, according to which decision-making would be based on simple economic opportunism. On the basis of an ultimatum game, with the participation of 352 students from the Faculty of Economics of the University of Salerno, the present work aims to verify whether the presence of a philanthropic component in a decision-making situation affects the choices of individuals. The analysis revealed that men and women
act differently, perhaps because guided by different degrees of other-regarding and reputation protection.
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ISSN: 1971-5293
ISSNe: 2283-3374
Esperienze d'Impresa, Reg. Tribunale Salerno n. 875 del 3/11/1993