Mario Testa, Antonio D'Amato


Economic theories have reconsidered the factors that guide the choices of individuals, not only focusing on those strictly economic. In recent years, the wide use of behavioural games has provided interesting evidence that contradicts the neoclassical axioms, according to which decision-making would be based on simple economic opportunism. On the basis of an ultimatum game, with the participation of 352 students from the Faculty of Economics of the University of Salerno, the present work aims to verify whether the presence of a philanthropic component in a decision-making situation affects the choices of individuals. The analysis revealed that men and women
act differently, perhaps because guided by different degrees of other-regarding and reputation protection.


Parole chiave

Behavioural Economics; Ultimatum Game; Philanthropy; Charity; Gender

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ISSN: 1971-5293

Esperienze d'Impresa, Reg. Tribunale Salerno n.875 del 3/11/1993